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Abstract
The scope of this paper lies in the study of the trust factor within electronic transactions.
Considerable importance has recently been given to this factor since the Net limits direct
interpersonal relations and often does not even allow recognition of the opposing party.
The risks of electronic commerce are also often highlighted, demonstrating that the
international legal mechanisms currently in place are inefficient. Using this assumption
as a starting point, the main risks of electronic markets will be highlighted and the
sources of trust proposed in the literature will be discussed. The main objective, however,
will be to analyze the extralegal mechanisms- in particular the creation of reputation
trust.

1.

Introduction

Parties undertaking an electronic transaction expose themselves to a level of risk that is
directly proportional to the amount of information available to each side. Economic
systems typically exhibit two situations (Klang, 2001): 1. perfect information where both
sides possess full relevant information needed to pursue the transaction, 2. informational
asymmetry in which there is an unequal distribution of information. Real economic
conditions are more typically characterized by the second scenario (Tan and Thoen,
2002). Ackelof (1997) elaborates on this concept with the classic example of the used car
market: the seller has information that the potential buyer does not possess, such as the
real or qualititative value of the car; the buyer, on the other hand, can only hypothesize
the value of the car in proportion to the time and evidence available to him, and because
the latter are limited, the actual selling price will not completely reflect the true car value.
Information asymmetries have a direct effect on the degree of risk since they leave space
for opportunistic maneuvering on both sides and reduce control over the final outcome of
the transaction (Williamson, 1975 and 1985)
The problem associated with informational asymmetries becomes even more critical in ecommerce where relationships are digitalized and a physical separation exists between
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parties (Bons et al., 2001). The screen created by the electronic medium- which inevitably
separates the parties involved in the transaction- limits direct interpersonal relationships
and recognition of the other party. Returning to Ackelof’s example, the electronic
transaction does not allow a degree of verification necessary for filling informational
gaps, and as a result opportunistic behavior can frequently manifest with the introduction
of incorrect or devious information. These baseline conditions have led some authors
such as Tapscott et al (2000) to state that the generation of trust is the sine qua non
condition for the proper functioning of a digital economy. Others have pointed to the lack
of legal mechanisms that could guarantee trust on the Internet. Klang (2001), for
example, believes that legal enforcement at the international level is inefficient, while Ba
et al (2002) have demonstrated that the legal system is incomplete in e-commerce.
The paper is a theoretical analysis with the objective of understanding the extralegal
mechanisms necessary for the trust generation - particularly with respect to reputation as
a value asset in electronic markets. Despite the theoretical contributions on the concept of
trust permit an analysis of both B2C and B2B relations, the paper principally used
business-to-consumer empirical evidence which allowed the formulation of the first
hypotheses on reputation mechanisms. These hypotheses can be verified in more depth in
future work related to B2B operators.
The underlying assumption of this work is the necessity for trust in electronic
transactions- this is highlighted in the second section, showing how the Internet
accentuated information asymmetries. The third section recalls the primary theoretical
contributions on the concept of trust, placing attention on the two main schools of
thought: the economic one that points to the institutions as the main mechanism in trust
generation (Coase, 1984; Dunn J., 1988; Williamson O.E., 1993) and the sociological one
that refers to social relations (Granovetter M., 1985; Shapiro S.P., 1987; Fukuyama F.
1995). In the fourth and the fifth section, the attention then turns to extralegal
mechanisms and, once reputation has been established as a value asset in electronic
markets, the factors for its generation will be discussed.

2.

Risks in Electronic Transaction

In Table 1 the conditions of guarantee required by a seller and buyer to conduct a
transaction, according to Froomkin (1996), are shown. In face-to-face relations, tangible
aspects of the exchange allow these guarantees to be provided. The physical presence of a
sales point favors information authentication on the product and who is selling it. The
execution of the transaction phases can be demonstrated by the exchange of paper
documents (confirmation, integrity and recourse). Receipts, as well as documents coming
from third parties (such as checks, receipt of a POS system or credit card) can confirm
payment; delivery receipts show that a good has been received. Such documents reduce
the possibility of a party denying the happening of actual physical events and furnishes
guarantees against a buyer’s potential refusal to pay or denials of receipt of the good.
When the transaction occurs over the Internet, several problems enter into play that are
related to the digitalization of the relationship. The first problem, cited by Ba and Pavlou
(2002), is related to authentication and certification problems deriving from the
anonymity of the transaction participants. In electronic auctions, for example, an e-mail is
all that allows identification of the buyer and seller, and such addresses are freely
available from an Internet Service Provider (ISP). The possibility of hiding one’s identity
creates a strong informational asymmetry that does not allow the opposing party to know
who is hiding behind a false email. The informational gap that is created leaves space for
opportunistic maneuvering that can lead to fraud and unethical behavior.
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Another problem is related to uncertainty regarding product quality and services (eg.
delivery). In e-commerce, the buyer visualizes a good as shown on a Web page and can
not verify the reported information, but has to trust the declarations of the sellers (Fung
and Lee, 1999). Internet represents a barrier that creates an informational asymmetry
between seller and buyer.
Table 1: Merchant and Buyer Desires (source: Froomkin, 1996).
Merchant’s Desires
Authentication. Knowing the buyer’s identity before making the sale may assist in proof
of order and guarantee of payment.
Certification. The merchant may need proof that the buyer possesses an attribute required
to authorize the sale.
Confirmation. The merchant needs to be able to prove any third party involved in the
transaction that the customer did indeed authorize the payment.
Nonrepudiation. The merchant wants protection against the customer’s unjustified denial
that he placed the order, or that the good were not delivered.
Payment. The merchant need assurance that payment will be made. This can be achieved
by having payment before sale, at time of sale, or by provision of a payment guarantee.
Anonymity. In same case, the merchant may want to control tha amount of transactional
information disclosed to customer.
Buyer’s Desires
Authentication. Confirming the seller’s identity prior to purchase helps ensure that goods
will be genuine, and that service or warranties will be provided as advertised.
Integrity. Protection against unauthorized payments.
Recourse. Comfort that there is recourse if the seller fails to perform or deliver.
Confirmation. A receipt.
Privacy. Control over the amount of buyer/transactional information disclosed to third
parties.
Anonymity. Control over the amount of transactional information disclosed to merchant.
As a result, e-commerce has the inevitable effect of increasing asymmetries already in
existence in traditional commercial interactions. The lack of complete information on the
opposing party and on the sold product creates an informational gap that leaves space for
what Williamson (1985) defines opportunistic behavior amongst relevant parties. Mishra
et al. (1998) illustrate examples of opportunistic behavior, such as the introduction of
false or incomplete information on a product, or deviations from contractual obligations.
Given that, Web interractions have a higher level of baseline risk with respect to
traditional exchanges: analysis of the trust factor and how to generate it becomes
important. This is the only way to limit risk and ensure low transaction costs (Jarvenpaa
& Tractinsky, 1999).
In the following section, several contributions to the theory of trust will be recalledstarting with a definition of the term and then proceeding to a classification of the main
mechanisms that contribute to Trust generation.
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3.

Dimensions of Trust

In the literature we may find a series of definitions of Trust1, summarized by Gambetta
(1988): “There is a degree of convergence in the definition of trust which can
summarized as follows: trust… is a particular level of the subjective probability with
which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular
action… When we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly
mean that the probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not
detrimental to us is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation
with him.” As expressed by Gambetta, trust has a strong subjective component linked to
how the individual perceives the reality in which he operates and the actions of the parties
he interacts with. The way in which agent ‘A’ evaluates the performance of agent ‘B’ is
the type of study that permits us to understand the trust factor and its generative
mechanisms. There are two schools of thought, however, that approach the issue from
different perspectives: the economic standpoint and the sociological one.
The first considers trust from the point of view of the environment in which the
transacting party operates, and the institutions that regulate his behavior. Coase (1984)
states that human action is guided by the constraints set by institutions (laws, norms,
government organs, banks and other intermediaries). This view brings Williamson (1993)
to consider trust as the analysis of these constraints and the risks associated with the
execution of the transaction (calculative trust). According to the economic school, the
subjective evaluation of ‘B’’s actions is done through an analysis of the institutions that
constrain the former’s actions. Contract clauses, institutions that control and supervise,
norms and intermediaries supporting the transaction provide the necessary guarantees for
“A” to operate within an economic system.
Table 2: Trust Generation in Economic Transaction
A defintion of
Trust
“Trust is a
particular level of
the subjective
probability with
which an agent
assesses that
another agent or
group of agent will
perform a particular
action” (Gambetta,
1988)

Trust dimension
Calculative
(Coase,1984;
Williamson, 1993)

School
Economic

Reputation (Granovetter, Economic/
1985; Zucker, 1986;
sociological
Shapiro, 1987)
Community (Deming,
1986; Shapiro, 1987;
Bigley and Pearce,
1998)

Sociological

Mechanisms for Trust
Generation
Institutions control and
guarantee economic
transactions. Laws, norms and
relevant official bodies
constrain human behavior.
Interaction amongst parties
generates (or destroys)
reputation, which in turn
generates (or destroys) Trust.
Social relationships create a
sense of belonging, moral
obligations and value sharing
that are the basis of deep trust.

The second school of thought -the sociological one- places greater emphasis on the
individual person behavior and character, as well as interpersonal relationships and group
interactive dynamics (Bigley and Pierce 1998). ‘A’ is studied as a member of a social
system within which he has a series of relationships, or ties, of varied nature (sentimental,
1

For a wide explanation about Trust definition see McKnight D.H. and Chervany N.L. (1996).
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kinship or belonging). Institutions are only cited when comparing the individual to
abstract systems such as law, security o health (Shapiro, 1987; Zucker, 1986). Such
studies have been applied within firms in the organization of human resources and in
economic interactions. Fukuyama (1995), for example, describes company networks as
based upon reciprocal moral obligations, conventions and social norms. Trust, from this
point of view, is indicated by Adler (2000) as a functioning principle of hybrid
coordination forms, set between the markets and hierarchies. While markets are based on
price and hierarchies on authority, these intermediary forms are based on trust.
Out of these two schools of thought, three dimensions of the Trust variable emerge- all
generally linked to the economic or sociological approach (see Tab.2). Calculative Trust,
Reputation Trust and Community Trust are the three interpretive models necessary for a
study of trust in economic transactions.
The objective of this work therefore becomes an analysis of the extralegal mechanisms of
trust generation, and will continue with an in-depth study of the mechanisms of reputation
while abandoning the approach of trust generation through legal constraints.

4.

Extralegal Trust Generation Mechanisms in the Internet Age

Zucker (1986) specifies extralegal mechanisms as interaction repetitiveness in a social
system. Part ‘A’ performs a transaction with part ‘B’ and comes to understand the latter’s
behavior and can express a judgment that will enhance or diminish B’s reputation. In an
economic system, internal interactions create (or destroy) the parties’ reputation,
generating (or destroying) trust. Reputation Research Network Community, cite in his
web-cite,
the
three
benefit
of
reputation
mechanism
(http://databases.si.umich.edu/reputations/):
•

helping people decide who to trust;

•

encouraging people to be more trustworthy;

•

discouraging those who are not trustworthy from participating.

Each party tends to initiate relationships with entities whose behavior or reputation is well
established (Granovetter, 1985; Shapiro, 1987). The reputation factor is an asset of
elevated value since it fluidifies the transaction and lessens the importance attributed to
contractual clauses (Chiles & McMackin, 1996).
The reputation of an operator allows us to evaluate his future behavior and therefore
understand whether he is trustworthy. Smith (1910) states that “it is not from the
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from
their regards to their own interest.” The point made here is that the regulation of
transaction occurs not through law but through the market mechanisms of trust and
reputation (Klang, 2001). Parties whose actions do not support their original promises
will develop an untrustworthy reputation and will no longer be able to operate.
Reputation creates increased fluidity in economic transactions and serves as a regulator of
opportunistic behavior. It is in the interest of each party to behave correctly since
incorrect actions are punished by a loss of reputation and eventually by a potential exit
from the market. Obviously, these effects can occur where parties know each other and
each other’s actions are verifiable. These mechanisms lose their efficacy in larger and
more complex realms, such as a large metropolis or a national geographic area. In this
case, unethical behavior has less resonance and the diffusion of distorted information is
not immediately verifiable or confrontable between parties. As a result, one would expect
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that the mechanisms of reputation are further dampened in digital environments: the
world wide electronic markets and the relative anonymity of the parties involved make it
difficult to judge the trustworthiness of a counterpart.
In reality, however, certain facts point in a different direction. Case studies such as
Amazon.com, Dell.com and eBay.com clearly show that creation of reputation has
consolidated their online leadership. Amazon comes to mind to any consumer that wishes
to purchase books through the Internet and despite the fact that a variety of operators have
attempted imitations, its repuation has allowed it to defend its leadership position (85%
share of online book sales). Dell.com retains 14.4% of the personal computer market
(second only to the colossal Compaq-hp, at 17.2%,), uniquely through online sales. Even
in this case the client trusts in the reputation of the Dell brand which guarantees the
correct execution of the electronic transaction. Finally, eBay has over 42.4 milion
subscribed users (eBay announcements, 2002), making it the best known reference point
for online auctions. eBay’s fame generates trust for the user who participates in Internet
auctions even if only done for the first time2.
In addition to these trends, it should also be noted that Jarvenpaa et al. (1999) and
Shneiderman (2000) are agreed in concluding that the successful online sales
performance is linked to the reputation of the operator and the latter’s dimensions.
The tendency to favor well-known business entities, whose performances in commercial
transactions are known, is also favored by the lack of other forms of guarantees.
Consumer trust in brand reputation is based on the lack of other mechanisms of control
over the execution of electronic transactions. Legislation associated with e-commerce is
still not clear and, to worsen matters, is not homogeneous across nations. In the European
Union, for example, several years are still required before all member states assign the
same value to an electronic document as that given to a its paper counterpart. At the
moment, each country uses procedures and different documents to ascertain the execution
of a transaction (es. the order itself, invoicing, delivery). Not even the legal value of these
is common across the world- often creating controversies (Tan and Thoen, 2002). Klang
(2001) recognizes that an appeal to international law is not efficient due to the lack of
agreements. Ba et al. (2002b) suggests three reasons why the legal system is incomplete:
1.“legal regulation and control cannot keep pace with the development of electronic
commerce”; 2.“the extant laws in conventional commerce might not be strictly
enforceable in electronic commerce”; 3.“resorting to legal enforcement in elctronic
commerce might be impracticably expensive or even impoossible for micro-payment
transactions”. The same authors also refer to extralegal mechanisms as a needed factor for
the performance of electronic transactions.
If we start with these assumptions, it then becomes imperative to understand how the
cited operators have generated reputation trust to the point that the consumer has chosen
to ignore the risks associated with electronic transactions. To this end, reputation trust
may serve as a critical component of a firm’s business strategy (Urban et al, 2000).

5.

Reputation as a Value Asset

In a variety of contexts, when one refers to the Internet, the term virtual is often
introduced: virtual economy, virtual markets, virtual transaction. Online business models
tend to virtually replicate real physical systems, such as traditional marketplaces.
2

Other examples which demonstrate the importance of repuation in the digital economy can be viewed at the
Reputation Reserach Network Community homepage: (http://databases.si.umich.edu/reputations/).
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Operators tend to digitally reproduce those mechanisms that permit regularity of
exchange and which Klang (2001) defines as the market mechanism of trust and
reputation.
The examples of Internet companies in the previous section show how reputation is a
highly valuable asset for those operating online and even has strategic impact (Urban et
al, 2000)3. What follows is an attempt to summarize the factors that influence the
reputation of online operators through both empirical evidence as well as theory proposed
in the literature.
Size
Jarvenpaa et al. (1999) developed and tested a theoretical model about the causes and
consequences of trust in an Internet store. Their model suggests that customers’
evaluations of a store’s reputation and size affect their trust in the store itself. Size in
virtual word is perceived as the presence that the entity has on the Web-this can be
influenced by advertising banners on other sites, the number of subscribed users, page
views and links that lead to the web site. The 42 million subscribed users of e-Bay, the
links to the site www.ebay.com in different e-shops and its international presence specific
to each country (eg . www.eBay.de, www.eBay.it), offer a glimpse of its size.
Also partnerships and acquisitions allow for a more powerful online presence. In 2001
Ebay acquired i-bazar- its primary European competitor- thereby consolidating its
position as the major online trading community (http://www.shareholder.com/ebay/news/
20010221-33047.htm). By typing in www.ibazar.com one gets directly linked to the eBay
homepage.
Relationship to the Non-Virtual World
Generally business entities that also have a physical presence- even just a certain
operational aspects such as distribution or delivery, generate a greater level of
trustworthiness towards the consumer, with a corresponding increase in reputation.
Brick-and-mortar stores help to build trust by providing a positive and tangible shopping
experience, a place to return unwanted purchases, a place to examine the goods and a
brand with which consumers are already familiar. As these advantages become more
widely acknowledged, some pure e-shop may become hybrids. Etrade and Gateway have
started to provide physical outlets, for example.
Network Systems of Relationships
Several authors believe that the source of reputation trust lies in belonging to a network
system of relationships (Granovetter, 1985; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995).
Reputation can be enhanced by creating a connection with established and well-known
entities. The client-supplier relationship also falls within this realm, where advantage is
derived, for example, by being the supplier of an accredited multinational company.
Dell.com, for example, has also consolidated its reputation by serving as a supplier to
government institutes and with U.S. public administration.

3

Reputation importance is highlight in reputation systems research community on the web, where people
study very specific mechanisms for collecting feedback from transaction parties in order to compute levels of
reputation (http://databases.si.umich.edu/reputations/).
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Palmer et al (2000) believe that relationships with intermediaries play an important role in
generating reputation trust. A company can take generate such trust by outsourcing its
payment processes to a secure and reliable bank, or by requesting the certification of
processes through a known entity.
Shankar et al (2002) also believe that online trust can be impacted through online
partnerships. Another example is the online alliance between AOL and Autoweb, an
online automobile selection servce. Being the preferred autoselection service on AOL,
Autoweb now stands to gain a higher level of trust from its stakeholders than when it
previously wasn’t linked to AOL. Obviously these strategies must be done with care
because, in this scenario, AOL may be perceived as biased, thereby losing a certain
degree of trust among its consumers.
Finally, another interesting case is that of Trusted Third Parties (TTT) that serves as a
security guarantee by placing their sigil on the homepages of Internet sites4. TTT’s sigils
increase the reputation on an online business entity, guaranteeing its users that its
behavior is ethical and conforming to the certification principles. Hoffman et al (1999)
considers user privacy policies an important factor in reputation: if the user perceives that
his data is being used for other motives (eg commercial benefit), the professional image
of the entity would be tarnished.
Feedback
Shapiro and Varian (1999) use the term positive feedback to explain first-mover
dynamics: the first to enter a market can take advantage of its dominant position, thereby
sparking a virtuous cycle that continues to consolidate its leadership. From the point of
view of reputation trust, positive evaluations increase reputation as well as market
position, sparking such a virtuous cycle; conversely, negative evaluations promote
negative feedback that can weaken the company.
In electronic markets, the identification of participants through digital certificates allows
an evaluation to be made on the opposing commercial party. Ba et al (2002b) have
shown- through the use of game theory- that feedback mechanisms regulate the market,
and in fact “the most utilitarian course of action for a market participant is to behave
honestly”.
eBay has created a feedback forum, where each buyer can give a score to the seller at the
end of each auction. The users with the highest score are classified as PowerSellers: they
are exemplary members who are held to the highest standards of professionalism, having
achieved and maintained a 98% positive feedback rating and an excellent sales
performance record.

6.

Conclusions

This paper- by recalling transaction cost theory- has pointed to the high risks present in ecommerce. Informational asymmetries are amplified by the electronic medium, thereby
accentuating opportunistic behaviour that is particularly hazardous for those buying and
selling through the Internet. Starting with this assumption, we have attempted to

4

The Industry Standard (1999) has ranked TRUSTe4 and BBB Online4 as the prime “security brands” capable of
generating Trust on the Net. Another well-known brand is VeriSign which certifies safe data transmission (Palmer et al.,
2000).
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understand how some business models have managed to generate trust for those operating
on the Internet and be successful.
The inefficiency of legal mechanisms for the proper functioning of electronic markets is
highlighted in recent studies (Klang, 2001; Tan e Thoen, 2002; Ba et al., 2002), and
serving as an obstacle in the creation of Institutional Trust. The same authors also refer to
extralegal mechanisms as necessary for the performance of electronic transactions.
The importance of Reptutational Trust thus becomes evident and allows the psychological
barrier created by the risk of electronic transactions to be overcome. The final part of this
work attempts to highlight the factors that allow one to create reputation online. From
what has emerged it is clear that the size of the business entity, the network system of
relationships/partnerships and the connection to the physical world are of paramount
importance. Finally, the creation of systems of online feedback allow the replication of
reputation mechanisms found in traditional offline marketplaces. Entities that operate
ethically obtain positive evaluations and consolidate their position, while those that act
unethically obtain negative evaluations with strong penalizing effects.
Finally, it is important to note that reputation is also highly important for the dynamics
that manifest in digital economy. In the particularly turbulent environment of the Net,
where it is easy to start a business and easy to fail-and where it is difficult to identify the
parties involved- reputation becomes a highly valuable asset.
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